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Abstract This article discusses the effects of European regulatory networks on the
bureaucratic autonomy of national regulators as regards regulatory rule-enforcement
and rulemaking. Drawing on institutional theory, the article elaborates scope conditions
for networks to yield an effect along this property and assesses these arguments in a
study of the formation and institutionalization of the European Competition Network
and how it structures relationships between competition authorities and resort ministries
in The Netherlands, Sweden and the non-EU member-state Norway. It is argued that by
virtue of accumulating and embedding strong norms of independence, the network
yields an “autonomizing” effect vis-à-vis participating organizations.
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Introduction
The rise of European regulatory networks (ERNs) is an important expression of the
institutionalization of a European Union (EU) multilevel regulatory administration
(Egeberg 2006a; Levi-Faur 2011a). ERNs offer a particularly interesting research site
for enduring puzzles within the study of political institutions. There are several
reasons why ERNs offer an interesting setting in this regard, the most important
one arguably being the fact that ERNs are a new and complex phenomenon in the EU
institutional setup. They are not accounted for in the formal treaties, yet they are
central for the realization of the substantive goals emanating from these frameworks.
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ERNs create a bridge between national and supranational administrations in
unprecedented ways. In particular, those parts of national administrations possessing
regulatory powers have increasingly become linking pins between the national and
supranational sphere. A core concern is thus to what extent ERNs change the nature
of national administrative systems by altering relationships between regulatory
agencies and their principals. Specifically, concerns have been raised that ERNs
are weakening the capacity of national politicians to control and steer those parts
of their national administrations have become integrated within European networks
of regulatory governance (cf. Martens 2008: 40). In this article we aim to examine
this claim empirically. The central question this article addresses is therefore: what
is the effect of ERNs on the bureaucratic autonomy of national regulatory authorities
(NRAs) participating in these networks? The focus on ERNs as the source of the
acclaimed causes of weakening (national) democratic control is warranted for at least
two reasons.
First, there is a clear normative concern. ERNs are not merely involved in strictly
regulatory implementation, i.e. monitoring, interpreting and enforcement of rules to
individual cases, but are increasingly important as regards regulatory rule-making as
well, seeing as they are engaged in elaborating and amending regulatory frameworks.
In particular, the close links that generally exist between ERNs and the “parent”
Directorate General (DG) of the European Commission (Commission) implies that
the expertise accumulated in ERNs forms an important asset for the Commission in
pre-pipeline regulatory policymaking (Coen and Thatcher 2008; cf. also Egeberg
2006b: 198). In other words, the structure and functioning of ERNs may produce
effects that increase the regulatory rule-making capacities of national regulatory
authorities vis-à-vis the formal rule-making institutions, such as the government or
parliament.
The second reason is of a theoretical nature. The literature on ERNs hosts different
and not always explicit assumptions on the effects of networks on bureaucratic
autonomy. In some frameworks, they are viewed as yielding a more or less indepen-
dent autonomizing effect (cf. Majone 1997, 2000) while in others they are arenas
wherein generic principal-agent relationships play out but with the added complica-
tion of introducing a second EU-level principal (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Eberlein
and Newman 2008). Others, still, contend that the network effect may very well be
negative, as supranational actors and the standards developed within ERNs may
constrain national participants (cf. Kelemen 2011; Wilks 2005). A challenge with
the literature on ERNs is that there is arguably a gap between “networks” on the one
hand and the “network effect” on the other. In brief, there is a need to clarify how and
under what conditions networks can yield an effect.
This article makes an effort in that direction by outlining relevant proxies of
bureaucratic autonomy and offering an explanatory framework drawing on institu-
tional theory, which highlights some meso-level scope conditions for ERNs to yield
an effect. These arguments are assessed empirically vis-à-vis one particular ERN,
namely the European Competition Network (ECN), which was formed as part of the
1999–2004 reform of EU antitrust administration. The article examines the institu-
tionalization of the ECN and subsequently compares its impact on the bureaucratic
autonomy of national competition authorities (NCAs) in three West European states.
In order to balance possible biases resulting from the comparatively strong
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supranational thrust generally seen as permeating this policy-area (Wilks and
McGowan 1996), the article compares adaptations towards the ECN in The
Netherlands, Sweden and the non-EU member state Norway, whose NCA is not a
full member of the network.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, the theoretical framework is
elaborated, followed by a presentation of the research design. The empirical analysis
then proceeds in two sections. First, the origins and institutionalization of the ECN
are discussed. Thereafter, a comparative analysis offers insights on the effect of the
ECN on the bureaucratic autonomy of NCAs. Drawing on these findings, the final
section offers some concluding inferences.
European Regulatory Networks and Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Conceptual
Framework
This section provides a conceptual framework for our study of the estimated effects of
ERNs on the bureaucratic autonomy of national regulatory authorities. First we will
discuss what the generic concept of bureaucratic autonomy entails within the context
of regulatory administration. Then, we will discuss the mechanisms of European
regulatory networks through which effects upon the degree of autonomy of regulatory
authorities are expected to be triggered.
Bureaucratic Autonomy in Regulatory Administration
Bureaucratic autonomy is a crucial organizational property in regulatory administra-
tion with particular implications for the dynamics of regulation through networks in
the EU. That is, the formal and factual autonomy of regulators from extraneous
concerns is likely to have an impact on the final products delivered by these entities.1
In general, bureaucratic autonomy is a highly variable organizational property. It is
likely to vary according to the relative degree of salience characterising a policy-area
wherein a bureaucratic agent operates (Jacobsen 1964, Olsen 2009), polity-features
such as the number of veto-players and/or degree of political uncertainty, as well as
policy-features, such as the degree of complexity and demand for substantive exper-
tise (Gilardi 2002; Elgie and McMenamin 2005).
Regulation comprises several partly overlapping but distinct sub-processes. If
regulation is understood as “rule-making, rule-monitoring and rule-enforcement as
a bureaucratic enterprise” (Levi-Faur 2011b: 3), what bureaucratic autonomy
implies and how much autonomy one can expect to observe is likely to depend
on what sub-process of regulation we are studying. When we thus apply the concept
of bureaucratic autonomy to the domain of regulatory administration, it should
address the two key processes that are central to regulation: rule-enforcement and
rulemaking.
1 The distinction between formal and factual autonomy is not trivial. A regulator can score high on formal
autonomy without being particularly autonomous in practice, and vice-versa. For an empirical investigation
of this puzzle, see Maggetti (2007).
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As regards rule-enforcement activities, bureaucratic autonomy firstly relates to the
extent to which a regulator can act with relative discretion when putting a legal
framework into practice, i.e. during the act of regulation. That is, regulators score
high on autonomy if they can apply legal frameworks, define what targets and
processes these frameworks are applicable to and sanction non-compliance without
external interference (Christensen 2001; Verhoest et al 2010). At the same time,
however, regulatory authorities are also involved in regulatory rulemaking. This
may involve codifying best practices and establishing guidelines against which
subsequent sectoral practices can be modeled and scrutinized. However, it can also
take the form of establishing more binding commitments, such as secondary legisla-
tion that elaborates and codifies the (often) open norms contained in regulatory
frameworks. Despite the mantra of role-purification, which loomed large in regula-
tory and administrative reforms of recent years (Christensen and Lægreid 2001,
2006), regulators organized at arm’s length from political masters are often involved
in policymaking as well as enforcement. Their experiences and comparatively higher
levels of substantive expertise make them valuable partners for the government
and/or the relevant resort ministries in the policymaking process (Bach 2010;
Maggetti 2009).
ERNs as Wielders of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Institutional Scope Conditions
ERNs harbor various assets that deem a study of their potential impact upon the
structure and organization of national administrative systems necessary. To begin
with, ERNs enable more or less stable patterns of interaction between regulators by
embedding decision-making and access structures that channel resources and orga-
nize attention (cf. March and Olsen 1976). ERNs may develop into actors in their
own right, paralleling and complementing other EU-level institutions as core compo-
nents in an emerging “single European regulatory space” (cf. Levi-Faur 2011a). The
institutionalization of ERNs as actors mirrors one important insight from the study of
national bureaucracies, in that their formal institutional design may be a rather weak
predictor of their future functioning (Krause and Douglas 2005). Principal-agent
theories emphasize the control problems that emerge as agents find their role and
interpret, or even reinterpret, their basic missions (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). At
the same time, any organization ultimately depends on its ability to develop a
distinct sense of purpose and a bureau-identity to accompany it in order to craft
a distinct “space” in the face of potential environmental threats to its existence
(Eisenstadt 1959).
In practice, ERNs may acquire properties akin to that of a distinguishable actor by
virtue of their close linkage to policy-directorates within the Commission and/or EU-
level agencies. As Levi-Faur (2011a: 823) argues, these actors “are making consid-
erable investments in institutionalizing them as their agents”, thus facilitating the
emergence of novel categories of actors such as “networked agencies” and “agenci-
fied networks” (cf. ibid: 825-826). Drawing on institutional theory, we will elaborate
on the importance of some formal and informal organizational-structural attributes as
preconditions for this to take place and sketch some expectations with regards to
implications for the bureaucratic autonomy of participating organizations.
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Scholars associated with the “transformation of executive politics in Europe”
branch of recent EU scholarship (Egeberg 2004, 2006a; Martens 2010; Trondal
2010) have emphasized the role of inter-institutional interdependencies in the
European administrative space. One particularly interesting contribution from this
camp has been the argument that structural devolution in national administrations has
been a handmaiden for new cooperative frameworks at the transgovernmental level.
Egeberg (2006a) argues that “agencification” has created capacities for autonomous
action in domestic regulatory administration that have made national regulators ideal
partners vis-à-vis the Commission in all stages of the regulatory process.
In a formal sense, cooperative frameworks that re-couple national regulators onto
transgovernmental arenas represent formal-structural conditions that are conducive to
a general strengthening of national regulators vis-à-vis other domestic actors. In
particular, the “incorporation” of ERNs (Eberlein and Newman 2008) designates
some organizations as members possessing the relevant expertise for the execution
of shared responsibilities, while other organizations are simultaneously excluded. The
fact that ERNs specify independent regulatory authorities (IRAs) as members, sug-
gests that the organizational specialization of ERNs at the outset signals an expecta-
tion for autonomous action among its incumbents.
The dynamics of de- and re-coupling at the transgovernmental level is likely to be
significantly shaped by relative strength of the main supranational actors, i.e. the
Commission, vis-à-vis the ERN in question (cf. Barbieri 2006). In some forums, the
Commission is merely an observer with few formal means of influencing network
activities while in others it has acquired coordinating competences to the extent that it
resemble a second principal vis-à-vis national regulators (Coen and Thatcher 2008).
This implies that while ERNs may emancipate regulators from domestic constraints,
new dependencies may take their place (cf. Martens 2010), thus possibly diminishing
the “net” autonomizing effect of ERNs.
When we now turn to the informal attributes of ERNs, we find additional and
possibly even more important assets that network incumbents can mobilize vis-à-vis
actors in their immediate surroundings. As with all organizations, ERNs may also
become infused with distinct norms and values (March and Olsen 2006; Selznick
1957). While such features take time to develop, ERNs are seldom created in an
institutional vacuum but are imbued with certain foundational traits that are likely to
shape their subsequent developmental paths. ERNs are established to facilitate close
cooperation between organizations facing similar concerns and arguably embed
strong norms of professionalism and, above all, independence. This does not imply
that activities do not have political implications or that interactions are com-
pletely de-politicised. However, norms of neutrality and independence establish
powerful thresholds against politicking as they frame appropriate behaviour
(March and Olsen 2006).
Especially, the expertise-heavy nature of ERNs suggests that activities are likely to
have a strong epistemic anchoring and influence may thereby be highly correlated
with the ability to produce professionally sound arguments (Haas 1992). Such norms
moreover constitute an asset that can be mobilised vis-à-vis external actors. Networks
may become “bearers of reputation” and thereby buffer external threats against the
autonomy of their incumbents (Majone 1997). Being member of a network gives
privileged access to accumulated expertise and may provide additional leeway in
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policymaking by linking organizational preferences to emerging consensuses in the
regulatory domain. That is, regulators may “punch above their weight” and gain
influence in policymaking processes where their formal role is secondary to that of
other actors by virtue of their “organizational reputation” (cf. Carpenter 2001). The
other side of this coin is that ERNs may also script appropriate organizational forms
and approaches within a given “field” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) that may be
incompatible with the interests and identities of their incumbents.
Research Design
Ceteris paribus other potential determinants of bureaucratic autonomy that we find in
the literature (e.g. national institutional setting, legal basis of authorities, agency
leadership, reputation, and so on), we expect that ERNs will have a positive effect
on the bureaucratic autonomy – both in terms of regulatory rule enforcement as well
as rule-making autonomy – of national regulatory authorities, that become member of
an ERN. The formal assets of ERNs that will positively contribute to national
regulatory authorities’ autonomy vis-à-vis their parent ministry is that membership
of an ERN extends the structural and organizational leverage of individual regulatory
authorities, incorporating them into a larger and more resourceful aggregate actor.
Informally, ERNs are seamless sources of expertise and the hearth of a genuine
transnational culture and ideas that differentiate individual regulatory authority from
strictly domestic political and administrative cultures and beliefs. In order to take
account of other potential explanations within the literature we employ a compar-
ative case design as we compare the effects of ECN on the bureaucratic autonomy
of national competition authorities (hereafter: NCAs) in The Netherlands, Sweden
and Norway.
The case selection has not been random but is informed by a wish to generate a
certain amount of contextual variance, inter alia to balance possible biases arising
from analysing developments within a comparatively well-institutionalized suprana-
tional policy-domain (i.e. European anti-trust policies), which suggests that it repre-
sents a “most likely” case in terms of observing a strong ERN-effect. The
comparative logic can be linked to what Frendreis (1983) identifies as a “mixed
systems” strategy, which combines elements of a most similar and most different
design and therefore allow for cases to vary along both dependent and independent
variables (cf. also Christensen and Lægreid 2001).
The cases chosen for analysis are fairly similar with regards to basic polity-
features. Moreover, they are similar to the extent that they have all adopted equivalent
antitrust frameworks that are enforced by semi-independent regulators. On the other
hand, different institutional and policy legacies exist and the discretionary leeway
enjoyed by the regulators vis-à-vis political executives can be expected to vary
accordingly. The countries also vary as regards their formal embedding into the EU
competition policy machinery. Including a competition regime wherein the NCA is
not a formal member of the ERN being studied, beyond balancing potential biases
resulting from the choice of research site, has the added value of increasing contex-
tual variance, thus facilitating a broader assessment of the relative effect of ERN-
participation, compared to other factors.
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In the following section, we first describe the independent variable: the back-
ground of the European Competition Network and its formal and informal attributes
that are expected to positively influence the bureaucratic autonomy of NCAs.
Thereafter we then assess the effects of these attributes of the ECN on the NCAs of
the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. For both parts, we have used both primary and
secondary sources of information, i.e. legal and institutional documents, a small
number of semi-structured interviews (N=15) conducted with informants in NCAs
and resort ministries in the three countries under study, in addition to a substantial
body of secondary literature.
The Autonomy-enhancing Attributes of the European Competition Network
Antitrust has become an increasingly important area of economic regulation, a
development illustrated by the fact the bulk of IRAs in the policy-domain have been
created over the past 25 years (cf. Gilardi 2005: 86). At the supranational level,
antitrust is a “quasi-constitutional” domain in addition to being a field of economic
regulation, intimately linked to the creation of a common market and thus the political
project of European integration (Gerber 1998; Maher 2004).
Supranational competences have traditionally loomed large in antitrust adminis-
tration. The basis for the Commission’s strong powers in the antitrust domain
emanated from Council Regulation 17/1962, which designated a central role for the
supranational regulator in the enforcement of the treaty-based prohibitions against
cartels and the abuse of dominant positions.2 Crucially, the regulation delegated to
the Commission the sole power to grant individual exemptions from the general
cartel prohibition3 upon prior notification of commercial agreements. The cen-
tralized enforcement system was instigated in order to forge regulatory capacities
that were largely nascent or non-existent at the domestic level at the time (cf.
Gerber 1998: 348–349). As a consequence, it also created formidable adminis-
trative challenges for the cartel directorate. Throughout the 1990s, demands for
comprehensive reform intensified, not only related to the administrative bottle-
necks challenging the centralized notification system (McGowan 2005), but
increasingly also targeting the main institutional peculiarity of EU antitrust
enforcement, which is that final decisions rests with the College of Commissioners
(Karagiannis 2007).
The solution that was opted for was to rely on the regulatory capacities that had
gradually emerged at the domestic level. The aforementioned strengthening of na-
tional competition policy enforcement from the 1980s onwards had created an
institutional infrastructure – a “third force” of regulation (Thatcher 2005) – that could
alleviate the increasingly salient capacity problems at the supranational level.
Moreover, as many national competition laws had gradually come to be modeled
on the EU prohibitions (Kassim and Wright 2010) conditions were increasingly
favorable with regards to trusting national authorities with new tasks.
2 These are now to be found in Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) respectively, and have remained materially unchanged since the Treaty of Rome (1957).
3 Cf. the exemption clause in Article 101(3) TFEU.
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The “modernization” of EU antitrust culminated in the adoption of Council
Regulation 1/2003, abolishing the notification system and decentralizing enforcement
responsibilities to national authorities. The sharing of enforcement tasks with NCAs
was conditioned upon their participation in a system allowing for information
exchanges and central oversight, in order to secure coherence in an enforcement
environment potentially characterized by institutional heterogeneity (cf. Cengiz
2010). This tightly coupled system was to be sustained by an ERN, the ECN, which
became fully operative as Regulation 1 went into effect on 1st May 2004.
While the ECN is mentioned in Recital 15 of Regulation 1, its practical operation
follows from a “joint declaration” between the Commission and the Council (2001)
and a subsequent Commission Notice (2004) outlining how the network will function
in practice. Thus, the network is a soft law construct and does not possess any legal
powers of its own (Wilks 2007: 442). It is essentially a platform designed to realize
the objectives set out in the implementing regulation and to facilitate the statutory
information exchanges in the enforcement of EU cartel prohibitions.4 To this end,
several arenas have been established that allow NCAs to discuss issues of common
concern, both related to enforcement and policy.5 The system as a whole is supported
by an obligation towards the acquis as EU antitrust prohibitions are enforced domes-
tically (cf. Art. 3(2) and 16(2)). The ultimate check in this regard is a “claw-back
clause” (Art. 11(6)) wherein the Commission can initiate proceedings on its own and
thereby relieve the acting NCA(s) of its competences.6
These supervisory arrangements are interesting from the perspective of bureau-
cratic autonomy. Previous research suggests that they were included to avoid a “re-
nationalization” of policy (Støle 2006: 92) inter alia by exposing common rules to
national regimes insufficiently detached from politics (Kassim and Wright 2010: 31,
footnote xxiv).7 Thus, bureaucratic autonomy emerges as something of a constitutive
imperative for this network, ultimately sanctioned by the supranational principal. The
primacy of autonomy in decision-making has been noted by scholars observing the
reform of EU competition antitrust enforcement as not only pertaining to the capac-
ities of national actors, but indeed the cartel directorate itself.
Karagiannis (2007) makes a case for viewing the creation of the ECN as a
deliberate strategy towards emancipating supranational antitrust enforcement via
“arena-shifting” (cf. Flinders and Buller 2006). That is, DG COMP acted upon the
‘Zeitgeist’ of subsidiarity, which provided strong justifications for dispersing
4 I.e. an obligation to apply EU rules in cases having an effect of trade between member-states (Art. 3(1)),
to notify the Commission when such investigations are initiated (Art. 11(3)) and to submit draft decisions
via the network (Art. 11(4)).
5 The ECN comprises a Director General meeting, a plenary consisting of heads of ECN units in DG
COMP and NCAs, horizontal working groups and sectoral subgroups (European Competition Network
2010: 4). In addition, a virtual structure provides for exchange of information related to enforcement. The
advisory committee originally set up under Regulation 17/1962 is not formally part of the ECN, but is still
an important forum where member states hear Commission decisions and discuss draft legal texts.
6 This was a continuation of Art. 9(3) in Regulation 17/1962, but it became more “acute” due to the
obligation to apply EU rules domestically. However, the Commission’s competences will normally be
activated only when agreements affect trade between three or more member-states, following paragraph 14
of the network notice.
7 This is particularly relevant as the Regulation itself is largely silent on the domestic organization of
antitrust, beyond obliging member-states to set up arrangements to secure that the objectives of the
regulation are effectively complied with (Art. 35)
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responsibilities, in order to alleviate some of its enforcement burdens while at the
same time improve its standing vis-à-vis other and less competition-friendly parts of
the Commission by introducing new levels of flexibility in enforcement.
“(B)y allowing DG COMP to arbitrage between a Collegial decision or a decision
by one or more national competition authorities, Regulation 1 and the ECN put an
end to the era of multi-task collegiality” (Karagiannis 2007: 309).
Thus, bureaucratic autonomy emerges as a defining imperative behind the ECN
also from the vantage point of the main supranational actor. One implication of this is
that it has strong incentives to forge good network relationships. Indeed, recent
empirical studies portray intra-network relations as permeated by a strong sense of
shared commitment to the network’s rationale and activities (Danielsen 2012; Kassim
and Wright 2010; Lægreid and Stenby 2010). The cooperative environment has
produced results that were not envisioned in Regulation 1, as the network has evolved
beyond mere enforcement and is now a ready provider of policy-relevant knowledge
vis-à-vis DG COMP in work on legislative questions, for instance related to the
drafting of block exemption regulations. Thus, (de-)autonomizing effects of the ECN
must be assessed against this background and the variable institutional responses this
is likely to trigger at the domestic level.
A Comparative Assessment of the “Network Effect”
The following comparative discussion assesses how the emergence of the ECN has
affected the bureaucratic autonomy of NCAs in the The Netherlands, Sweden and the
(formal) outsider Norway, drawing on the conceptualization of bureaucratic autono-
my provided earlier. The analysis maps core features of ECN-related adaptations for
each of the three cases separately, with our main interest being the relationship
between the respective NCAs and their domestic principals (e.g. government and/or
parent ministry).
The Netherlands
The Netherlands adopted the first prohibition based competition law in 1998,
marking a decisive step towards harmonizing Dutch antitrust regulation towards
the European regime. Antitrust falls under the portfolio of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (Ministerie van Economische
Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie) and is enforced by the Dutch Competition
Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, hereafter NMa), created by the
1998 competition act.
In the first years of applying the EU-harmonized competition law, the NMa was
not an independent agency but a sub-unit of the ministry, headed by a director
general. Antitrust decision-making was therefore subjected to political steering, both
via the issuing of guidelines on the interpretation and enforcement of the competition
law but also by the fact that the minister retained the right to intervene in politically
salient decisions. These prerogatives were deemed necessary given that NMa was a
new authority enforcing a novel legal framework and therefore in need of political
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guidance on how to interpret and apply the law (van de Gronden and de Vries 2006).8
In 2005, NMa was made an independent administrative authority and the director
general post was replaced by a three-person board and headed by a president. NMa
staff continued to be employed by the ministry but under the authority of the board in
matters pertaining to the enforcement of the law. Political intervention in individual
cases was abolished, but the minister retains the possibility to instruct the board on
how to take interests other than economic ones into account.
The EU affects NMa via two main channels, via its participation in various EU and
ECN-level arenas and, secondly, through the application of EU antitrust rules in the
Dutch context. NMa-officials participate broadly across the ECN-structure and the
agency cooperates closely with sister-agencies in other EU member-states as well as
the Commission as regards the enforcement of EU antitrust rules.9 While NMa is
fully subjected to the competition acquis and the requirements stipulated in
Regulation 1/2003, a second and somewhat more elusive measure of EU-level effects
concerns how the agency has made use of its formal discretionary powers to
voluntarily adapt to the EU model when developing guidelines and notices
concerning the enforcement of antitrust rules. In this regard, previous research
indicates that NMa has pushed its own regulatory priorities closer to the EU model
by forging competition in domains previously more or less insulated form market
forces, including the traditional Dutch “third sector” areas such as social housing
corporations and health care delivery (Yesilkagit 2007). Such a regulatory profile is
probably closer to the “sound micro economics” approach characterising EU-level
developments (cf. Monti 2004) than the neo-corporatist framework Dutch competi-
tion policy initially emerged from.
The shift in enforcement profile has arguably made NMa’s autonomy more salient.
Particularly in purely domestic cases related to for instance the health care sector,
social housing, the construction sector and national gas monopoly, decisions of the
NMa gain saliency, especially when they question the position of established interests
in these areas (e.g. the medical practitioners). Recent developments in the relationship
between the agency and the ministry unveil attempts from the political level to curb
some of the discretionary powers enjoyed by NMa. Article 13 of the so-called
“relations protocol”, explicating the relationship between NMa and the resort minis-
try, was amended in 2010 and now obliges NMa to submit draft executive decisions
to the minister for approval (Staatscourant 12076, 29.07.2010) .10 While this
suggests the presence of dynamics that are clearly detrimental to the logic underpin-
ning the ECN, recall that this network is explicitly specialized as to contain such
“residual noise” stemming from domestic politics and prevent it from reaching the
network. Perhaps as a consequence, then, the changes to the “relations protocol” have
not effected the international department within NMa, which is the unit responsible
for coordinating ECN-activities.11
8 That being said, subsequent ministers never made use of their prerogatives to intervene in agency
decisions.
9 Interviews, NMa 16.09.2010; Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 06.12.2011, cf.
also Yesilkagit (2007).
10 This was brought on by NMa’s decision to impose lower tariffs on the national gas company, which the
minister considered to go against the general economic interest of The Netherlands.
11 Cf. interview, NMa, 16.09.2010.
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The EU-related dimension of NMa’s work appears to be far less salient than its
domestic role, as role-specifications are more or less unambiguous and the relation-
ship between the resort ministry and the agency is characterised by mutual under-
standing. NMa handles the bulk of ECN-related tasks in its capacity as the competent
authority and thereby outside the scope of ministerial control. When legislative
matters are discussed within the network, however, this relationship changes. The
privileged access enjoyed by NMa to key ECN-forums at an early stage in policy-
making processes implies that it will take the lead in legislative matters as well. Yet,
legislation is formally the ministry’s turf and NMa forwards all relevant information
in this regard to the ministry and a common position is developed via consultations
prior to discussions at the EU-level, where NMa either participates on its own or
alongside officials from the ministry.12
While such coordination routinely unveils different priorities, both actors appear
aware of their formal roles and the peculiarities characterising the arena within which
common positions are eventually forwarded. That is, as the Commission can adopt
regulations on its own much is to be gained by downplaying diverging opinions and
instead focus attention towards producing a sound argument as a route to influence.
This is apparently a main consideration underlying the relationship between the two
levels with regards to the ECN. By virtue of its competence and its privileged access
to the network, however, NMa arguably has the upper hand vis-à-vis the more
multifunctional resort ministry also with regards to legislative discussions.
Sweden
Competition policy falls under the dossier of the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and
Communications (Näringsdepartementet), administered by the Swedish Competition
Authority (Konkurrensverket, hereafter KKV) established in 1992. Having tradition-
ally based antitrust regulation on an abuse-based framework, Swedish legislators
copied the entire body of material EU antitrust law in 1993, when preparing mem-
bership in the EU/EEA (Jacobsson and Sundström 2006: 92).
The independence of Swedish agencies is linked to the centuries-old principle of
political-administrative dualism, which constitutionally prohibits ministerial interven-
tion in agency decision-making when they act on the basis of public law and decides
on single cases. It is the government and not the individual minister who is respon-
sible for Swedish agencies (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). General political guidance
thus occurs via budgetary allocations specifying key tasks and objectives to be met by
the agency (cf. Jacobsson and Sundström 2006). While this model appears straight-
forward on paper, its actual implementation has been characterised by variable
enthusiasm, in that responsibilities have been moved back and forth between minis-
tries and agencies depending on the salience of the issues at hand and the available
expertise in the ministry (Jacobsson 1984; Jacobsson and Sundström 2006). The
formal framework as regards antitrust therefore implies that all questions related to
enforcement are explicitly out of bounds for the ministry, while in legislative matters
the ministry is in the driving seat, as the closest interlocutor vis-à-vis the government.
12 Cf. Interviews, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 06.12.2011; Interviews NMa,
16.09.2010.
The Effects of European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory…
Sweden’s adaptation towards the EU competition acquis through the adoption of a
prohibition-based framework coincided with a general restructuring of the Swedish
economy following a period of decline (Gerber 1998: 411). In the early years, a major
activity therefore concerned negotiating exemptions from the EU-harmonized rules in
areas where national regulatory practices had traditionally been more lenient (cf.
Mörth and Jacobsson 1998: 12). KKV has over time become heavily Europeanized
however, both in terms of its regulatory profile and its organizational linkage to the
ECN. Contacts with sister agencies and the Commission are frequent and KKV is an
active participant in all ECN-related activities.13 Indeed, Jacobsson and Sundström
(2006: 92) comment on KKV’s European embedding by noting that the agency
“is now equally part of the EU administration as the Swedish, or maybe more”
(authors’ translation).14
European integration has arguably challenged the dualist principle of a strict
division of labour between politics and administration as it has spurred a need for
inter-sectoral coordination (Jacobsson and Sundström 2006; Jacobsson et al 2004).
This is illustrated by Sundström’s (2000) analysis of the relationship between KKV
and the resort ministry concerning participation in the committees that were set up to
advice the Commission on its implementation of antitrust rules in the transport area.
In these committees the ministry would send its own officials to participate alongside
the agency even though individual cases were discussed, as this was enabled by the
specific implementing regulations establishing these committees (cf. Sundström
2000: 47). Following the instigation of Regulation 1/2003 as the general procedural
framework these sector-specific committees are gradually disbanded, implying that
key decisions will increasingly be made via the general advisory committee.15 While
this development appears to have been welcomed by Swedish competition officials, it
nevertheless curbs the flexibility previously enjoyed by the ministry with regards to
representing Sweden in the EU competition advisory committees.
The emergence of the ECN arguably reasserts the strict division of labour implied
by the dualist principle as it narrows the scope for organizing transgovernmental
relations by designating who the legitimate actors are. The ministry and KKV both
emphasise the importance of this principle in defining their relationship with regards
to EU-level arenas.16 The bulk of ECN-related activities therefore reside with KKV,
strictly out of scope for the ministry. As in the Dutch case, the roles shift when it
comes to legislation. Here, KKV is bound by national mandates but as the Swedish
position is based on information provided by the agency,17 it can be seen as exerting
considerable influence as it enjoys privileged access to decision-shaping forums
within the ECN before issues are eventually put on the agenda as draft legislation.
Moreover, the Swedish approach to coordinating national standpoints in the compe-
tition area is arguably particularly favourable with regards to the agency exerting such
13 Interview, KKV, 17.12.2010.
14 In one sense this assertion is valid for all NCAs of EU member states following the enactment of
Regulation 1/2003. Strictly speaking, the “allegiance” of an NCA ultimately depends on the ratio of EU-
related enforcement relative to the enforcement of national competition laws.
15 Cf. also interviews, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, 17.12.10.
16 Interviews, KKV, 17.08.2010, 03.09.2010 and 17.12.2010; Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and
Communications, 17.12.2010.
17 Cf. interviews KKV, 17.12.2010; Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, 17.12.2010.
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influence. As Sundström and Jacobsson (2007: 22) note, KKV has enjoyed broad
mandates in EU-level forums as a conscious strategy aimed at increasing its credi-
bility, based on the assumption that credibility is a necessary condition for exerting
influence in the expertise-heavy EU competition committees.
Norway
The first designated Norwegian designated competition law (1993)18 did not follow
the Swedish route of full-on EU harmonization. With the entry into force of the EEA-
agreement, two parallel legal frameworks would come to apply, namely a (still
largely) abuse-based national competition law and a prohibition-based EEA compe-
tition law, which copied the EU antitrust prohibitions (Bue 2000).19 It was not until
2004 that an EU-harmonized national competition law was put in place.
Competition policy falls within the dossier of the Ministry of Government
Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (Fornyings-, administrasjon- og kirke-
departmentet), whereas the main operative enforcer is the Norwegian competition
authority (Konkurransetilsynet, hereafter KT). The autonomy of KT has been a
salient topic ever since its establishment in 1994. While semi-independent agencies
(direktorater) have a long history as central government organizations in Norway,
they are formally embedded in the central government hierarchy. Indeed, the com-
petition authority of Norway is not only KT but also the parent ministry and the King
(i.e. cabinet).
Prior to 2004, KT operated in the shadow of ministerial hierarchies in two
important respects, as it was both formally under ministerial instruction and decisions
taken by KT could be appealed to the ministry. In practice, however, KT enjoyed
substantial autonomy as instructing the agency would invoke substantial reputational
costs in terms of blurring the organizational distinction between decisions and appeals
(cf. also Folmo 2005: 78–79). With the emergence of a centre-right (minority)
government in 2001, the commission set up in 2000 to prepare a new competition
law was reinstructed to explicitly address the independence of KT (Grønlie and Flo
2009: 346). A new model was proposed, which would remove the right to issue
instructions as well as move the appeals to an independent body. This was also in line
with this government’s general program for reforming Norwegian regulatory agencies
(Christensen and Lægreid 2010). In the end, a compromise was reached. The 2004 act
removed the possibility of instructing KT in individual decisions, but appeals would
still largely remain in the ministry unless KT issues fines, upon which appeals must
be taken to the courts.20
The EEA-agreement established a parallel institutional structure wherein the EFTA
Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court mirror the functions of the
18 Prior to this law, competition policy was part of a general price regulation framework (Bakke 2005).
19 Article 53 and 54 EEA essentially mirror Article 101 and 102 TFEU.
20 However, KT can be instructed to take on cases. In addition, section 13 of the competition act allows ”the
King in Council” (i.e. cabinet) to approve conduct otherwise caught by the general prohibitions as well as
reverse cease and desist decisions taken by KT ”in cases involving questions of principle interest or
interests of major significance to society”. While outside the scope of this article, possibilities for
ministerial and political intervention in merger cases are more substantial.
The Effects of European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory…
Commission and the European Court of Justice respectively. The decentralization
component of Regulation 1/2003 was not fully paralleled as regards the enforcement
of the EEA competition rules, despite Norwegian policymakers’ expectations to the
contrary (Lægreid and Stenby 2010). Instead, the EEA competition rules continue to
be principally enforced by ESA and the Commission. If infringements fail to meet the
thresholds making either the Commission or ESA competent authority, KT will
enforce them as if they were domestic cases under the national competition law.21
In practice, however, KT’s enforcement of the EEA competition rules will predom-
inantly be related to assisting ESA and the Commission. Participation in the ECN is
therefore first and foremost given priority as a channel for influencing rule-making
developments at the EU level, seeing as the ECN is not active in the enforcement of
the EEA competition rules (cf. Fornyings- administrasjon og kirkedepartementet 2010).
Norwegian antitrust policies have followed a distinct national trajectory, display-
ing elements of both convergence and divergence vis-à-vis the EU regime. The so-
called “bonus prohibition” in the Norwegian competition act, which prohibited bonus
programs on domestic flights in order to promote competition among Norwegian
airlines, illustrates the latter (Hjelmeng and Sørgard 2011). EU developments never-
theless implicate KT in two important ways. First of all, new EEA-relevant legislation
is added to the agreement and thus adopted as national law. Secondly, it has been an
explicit goal to harmonize the application of the national law vis-à-vis the EU model.
Therefore, general policy developments are also of crucial importance vis-à-vis
domestic practices.22 For instance, KT’s proposal for changes to national leniency
policy was directly based on the leniency program developed within the ECN
(Fornyings- administrasjon- og kirkedepartementet 2010: 15). Thus, while KT is
not a formal member of the ECN, it is nevertheless actively present across the
network. In 2007, an amendment to Protocol 23 to the EEA-agreement23 regularized
KT’s access to policy-discussions within the network and furthermore provided for
the transfer of all relevant (including confidential) information for these purposes.
One pertinent implication of KT’s formal outsider-status is that the formal auton-
omy enjoyed under the national competition law does not apply to EEA-activities.
The general relationship between KT and the ministry follows from a “cooperation
notice” (Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet 2010), which delegates
the bulk of operative ECN-activities to KT under nominal ministerial control. As the
EEA-rules are principally enforced by the ESA and the Commission, the ministry has
organized itself into EEA-cases as a national competition authority and retains the
right to instruct KT in EEA-related matters.24 While the ministry can be seen as
having a strong formal role vis-à-vis KT, the actual relationship is however more
21 That is, if KT is deemed best placed to act, the restrictions on ministerial instructions will be as under the
national competition law. The transfer of cases between EFTA authorities and ESA takes place via a
network of EFTA competition authorities, paralleling the ECN in the EFTA pillar (Fornyings-
administrasjon- og kirkedepartementet 2010: 29). It must also be noted that the prerogatives under
Section 13 of the national competition law (cf. footnote 20 above) do not apply to these cases (Hjelmeng
and Sørgard 2011: 24).
22 Cf. Interviews, Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, 20.08.2010;
Interview, KT, 03.12.2010 (cf. also Lægreid and Stenby 2010: 7).
23 This protocol outlines the division of labor between ESA, the Commission and the NCAs of
EFTA-states.
24 Cf. Fornyings- administrasjon- og kirkedepartementet 2010: 8.
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similar to the cases discussed earlier in that the ministry is more predominantly
engaged in legislative work within the ECN, and under these circumstances KT is
formally acting on centrally coordinated national mandates.25
The perils of associated membership seem to impact on how formal frameworks
play out in practice. While the ministry retains the right to request information and
instruct KT, the organizational specialization of the ECN clearly discourages minis-
terial activism by creating thresholds for what sort of information non-core actors can
hope to receive. That is, KT’s obligations to submit information to the ministry must
be balanced against its commitments to the network and in particular the signals
received from the network principal.26 As mandates are ultimately based on infor-
mation regarding network activities (Lægreid and Stenby 2010), what the formal
structure prescribes in terms of authority and influence is therefore quite possibly an
imprecise predictor of how these properties play out in practice.
Discussion and Conclusion
The central rationale of this article has been to sketch a meso-level explanation in
order to analyze the dynamics and significance of ERNs and we have illustrated the
relevance of this account by highlighting their effects on core organizational proper-
ties of their incumbents. This article has focused on bureaucratic autonomy and
argued in favor of employing a broader perspective on autonomy that is more
sensitive to the breadth of regulatory sub-activities ERNs are involved in, and focused
in particular on meso-level conditions under which ERNs may exert an effect on the
bureaucratic autonomy of participating organizations.
Our empirical observations illustrate the relevance of such a meso-level account.
The article has demonstrated how the ECN emerged as a response to increasingly
vocal demands for comprehensive changes, wherein the credibility of the suprana-
tional regulator itself was at stake. The ECN was thus as a “disciplined” (Wilks 2007)
solution to these capacity problems, but it is a solution wherein the “network
manager” has more in common with the participating national actors than its supra-
national peers. The ECN increasingly carries an institutional weight of its own,
despite its predominantly soft law foundation and (formally) centralized organiza-
tional structure, with significant implications the participating national actors. Our
findings suggest that across all three national competition regimes, the NCAs have
become strengthened vis-à-vis domestic resort ministries as a function of the institu-
tionalization of the ECN. Clearly, the analyses demonstrate the importance of sepa-
rating between formal and factual expressions of bureaucratic autonomy, as
“autonomizing” effects also materialize with regards to policymaking processes.
The institutionalist framework adopted in this article implies that we have given
preference to meso-level variables, and in this regard we have also emphasized the
role of contextual variables embedding regulatory authorities at the domestic level. In
25 Interviews, KT, 05.11.2010, 03.12.2010 (cf. also Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet
2010: 21).
26 Cf. Interviews, Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, 20.08.2010;
interview KT 03.12.2010.
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the final analysis, bureaucratic autonomy is both forged and possibly constrained as
regulators are embedded across different “orders” prescribing different and not
always easily reconcilable decision-making premises (cf. Olsen 2007).
The article has shed light on what happens when elements of national and
emerging transnational administrative systems cross path. The emergence of trans-
national entities such as the ECN may, first of all, reinforce elements of the
established institutional order. This is illustrated by the observation that the dualist
principle in Swedish administrative governance has arguably been reasserted as
regards KKV’s ECN-related work. What we learned from the Dutch case is that
the ECN may consolidate the bureaucratic autonomy of the regulator when the
NMa is acting upon cases with a strong European or international dimension, as
was illustrated by reference to the recent domestic attempts to curb the regulator’s
bureaucratic autonomy. However, in cases where a European dimension is as good
as absent, the autonomy of the NMa becomes a function of other determinants,
such as its leadership’s skills, public opinion and its formal autonomy. Finally, the
analysis also demonstrates how the ECN may at times also buffer the effects of
formal domestic constraints. The Norwegian case illustrates this final point, as
ECN-related activities are both subjected to excessive formal coordination and at
the same time significantly framed by the modus operandi of this network, which
effectively discourages activism on behalf of non-core actors, such as resort
ministries and thereby frame access-structures in favor of the competition
authority.
The theoretical ambition of this article is essentially generic as it has emphasized
the significance of inter- and intra-bureaucratic dynamics in shaping transnational
regulatory spaces. As such, the article has sought to contribute to the literature on the
political significance and, by extension, democratic implications of bureaucratic
organization (see Farazmand (2010) and Peters (2010) for recent contributions to
this debate). The article has made a case for viewing ERNs as actors and emphasized
some institutional scope conditions under which they are likely to yield an effect
vis-à-vis their incumbents. When this line of reasoning has value for the study of
multilevel antitrust governance, with its institutional peculiarities, there are no a
priori reasons to assume that this approach will not be of relevance vis-à-vis other
domains. Rather, this article has suggested a reinterpretation of the dynamics of
change in transnational regulatory administration, in particular emphasizing the
meso-level embedding of the politics of structural choice and the role and signifi-
cance of regulatory bureaucracies at the transnational level. The merits of this
approach should therefore deserve further attention from students of other regulatory
domains as well.
References
Bach, T. (2010). Policy and management autonomy of federal agencies in Germany. In P. Lægreid & K.
Verhoest (Eds.), Governance of public sector organizations. Proliferation, autonomy and performance.
Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke.
Bakke, E. (2005). Fra regulering til konkurranse (”From regulation to competition”). Horisont, 1(2005),
10–23.
O.A. Danielsen, K. Yesilkagit
Barbieri, D. (2006). Transnational networks meet national hierarchies: the cases of the Italian competition
and environment administrations. In M. Egeberg (Ed.), Multilevel union administration: the transfor-
mation of executive politics in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Bue, L.A. (2000): Nasjonale konkurranseregimer under press. En komparativ studie av europeiseringen av
det norske og svenske konkurranseregimet (”National competition regimes under pressure: a compar-
ative study of the Europeanization of the Norwegian and Swedish competition regime”). Rapport 0007.
Bergen: Stein Rokkan Center for Social Science.
Carpenter, D. (2001). The forging of bureaucratic autonomy. Reputations, networks and policy innovation
in executive agencies 1862-1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cengiz, F. (2010). Multilevel governance in competition policy: the European Competition Network.
European Law Review, 35, 660–677.
Christensen, J. G. (2001). Bureaucratic autonomy as a political asset. In B. G. Peters & J. Pierre (Eds.),
Politicians, bureaucrats and administrative reform. London: Routledge.
Christensen, T. and P. Lægreid (2001, eds.): New public management. The transformation of ideas and practice.
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2006). Autonomy and regulation. Coping with agencies in the modern state.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2010). Increasing complexity in public organizations – the challenges of
combining NPM and post-NPM features. In P. Lægreid & K. Verhoest (Eds.), Governance of public
sector organizations. Proliferation, autonomy and performance. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Coen, D., & Thatcher, M. (2008). Network governance and multilevel delegation: European networks of
regulatory agencies. Journal of Public Policy, 28, 49–71.
Council Regulation (EEC) 17/1962: Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty. O.J. P 013, 21.02.1962
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of December 16 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1, 04.01.2003.
Danielsen, O. A. (2012). Structuring transnational regulatory space: contending images of the design and
implementation of European regulatory networks. Paper presented at the annual department seminar of
the Department of Administration and Organization Theory, 5–6 December 2012.
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron-cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective
rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev, 48, 147–160.
Eberlein, B., & Newman, A. (2008). Escaping the international governance dilemma? Incorporated trans-
governmental networks in the European Union. Governance, 21, 25–52.
Egeberg, M. (2004). An organisational approach to European integration: outline of a complementary
perspective. European Journal of Political Research, 43, 199–219.
Egeberg, M. (2006a). Multilevel union administration: the transformation of executive politics in Europe.
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Egeberg, M. (2006b). Conclusion. In M. Egeberg (Ed.), Multilevel union administration: the transforma-
tion of executive politics in Europe. Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke.
Eisenstadt, S. (1959). Bureaucracy, bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization. Adm Sci Q, 4(3), 302–320.
Elgie, R., & McMenamin, I. (2005). Credible commitment, political uncertainty, or policy complexity?
Explaining the discretion granted to independent administrative authorities in France. British Journal
of Political Science, 35, 531–548.
European Commission (2004): Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition
Authorities. OJ C 101, 27.04.2004.
European Commission and the Council (2001): Joint statement of the Council and the Commission on the
functioning of the network of competition authorities. 15435/702.
European Competition Network (2010): “A look inside the ECN: its members and its work”. ECN Brief
Special Issue, December 2010. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/05_2010/brief_
special.pdf (last visited 10.12.2012).
Farazmand, A. (2010). Bureaucracy and democracy: a theoretical analysis. Public Organization
Review, 10, 245–258.
Flinders, M., & Buller, J. (2006). Depoliticization, democracy and arena-shifting. In T. Christensen & P.
Lægreid (Eds.), Autonomy and regulation. Coping with agencies in the modern state. Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Folmo, J. (2005). Konkurransetilsynet: en studie av endringsprosesser og reguleringsatferd. («The com-
petition agency: a study of organizational change and regulatory behavior»). Department of Political
Science: Oslo.
Fornyings- administrasjon og kirkedepartementet (2010): EØS-avtalens konkurranseregler. Samarbeidet
mellom FAD og Konkurransetilsynet i EØS-saker (”The competition rules of the EEA-agreement: the
The Effects of European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory…
cooperation between the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform and the Competition
Authority in EEA-matters”). Public version. January 2010. Oslo: Fornyings-, administrasjon og
kirkedepartementet.
Frendreis, J. P. (1983). Explanation of variation and detection of covariation: the purpose and the logic of
comparative analysis. Comparative Political Studies, 16, 255–272.
Gerber, D. (1998). Law and competition in Twentieth century Europe: protecting Prometheus. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gilardi, F. (2002). Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative
empirical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 873–893.
Gilardi, F. (2005). The institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism: the diffusion of regulatory
agencies in Western Europe. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 598, 84–101.
Grønlie, T., & Flo, Y. (2009). Sentraladministrasjonens historie etter 1945 (”The history of the Norwegian
central government after 1945”). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination. Int Organ,
46, 1–35.
Hjelmeng, E. and L. Sørgard (2011): Konkurransepolitiske virkninger av EØS-avtalen. (”Effects of the
EEA-agreement on competition policy”). Report no. 15. Oslo: Europautredningen
Jacobsen, K. D. (1964). Teknisk hjelp og politisk struktur (”Technical help and political structure”). Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget.
Jacobsson, B. (1984). Hur styrs förvaltningen? (”How is the administration governed?”). Lund:
Studentlitteratur.
Jacobsson, B., & Sundström, G. (2006). Från hemvävd til invävd. Europeiseringen av svensk förvaltning
och politik (”From homebound to embedded. The Europeanization of Swedish administration and
politics”). Stockholm: Liber Forlag.
Jacobsson, B., Lægreid, P., & Pedersen, O. K. (2004). Europeanization and transnational states.
Comparing Nordic central governments. London: Routledge.
Karagiannis, Y. (2007). Preference heterogeneity and equilibrium institutions: the case of European
competition policy. Florence: European University Institute.
Kassim, H. and K. Wright (2010): The European Competition Network: a regulatory network with a
difference. Paper presented at the ECPR Regulation Conference, Dublin, June 2010.
Kelemen, R. D. (2011). Eurolegalism. The transformation of law and regulation in the European Union.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kiewiet, D. R., & McCubbins, M. D. (1991). The logic of delegation. Congressional parties and the
appropriations process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krause, G. A., & Douglas, J. W. (2005). Institutional design versus reputational explanations of agency
performance: evidence from U.S. macroeconomic and fiscal projections. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 15, 281–306.
Lægreid, P., & Pedersen, O. K. (1999). Fra oppbygning til ombygning i staten. Organisasjonsendringer i
de nordiske landene.(”From construction to reconstruction of the state: organizational changes in the
Nordic countries”). Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag.
Lægreid, P. and O. Stenby (2010): Europeanization and transnational networks. A study of the Norwegian
competition authority. JPRG Paper No. 25, September 2010. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Forum for
Regulation and Governance.
Levi-Faur, D. (2011a). Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: towards a single European
regulatory space”. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(6), 810–829.
Levi-Faur, D. (2011b): The Odyssey of the regulatory state. Episode one: the rescue of the welfare state.
JPRG Paper No. 39, November 2011. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Forum for Regulation and Governance.
Maggetti, M. (2007). De facto independence after delegation: a fuzzy-set analysis. Regulation &
Governance, 1, 271–294.
Maggetti, M. (2009). The role of independent regulatory agencies in policymaking: a comparative analysis.
Journal of European Public Policy, 16, 445–465.
Maher, I. (2004). Networking competition authorities in the European Union: diversity and change. In C. D.
Ehlerman & I. Atanasiu (Eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU
network of competition authorities. Oxford/Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing.
Majone, G. (1997). The new European agencies: regulation by information. Journal of European Public
Policy, 4, 262–275.
Majone, G. (2000). The credibility crisis of Community regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38,
273–302.
O.A. Danielsen, K. Yesilkagit
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1976). Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2006). The logic of appropriateness. In M. Moran, M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martens, M. (2008). Run-away bureaucracy? Exploring the role of Nordic regulatory agencies in the
European Union. Scandinavian Political Studies, 31(1), 27–43.
Martens, M. (2010): Organized administrative integration. Report 10/2. Oslo: ARENA Centre for
European Studies.
McGowan, L. (2005): Europeanization unleashed and rebounding. Assessing the modernization of EU
cartel policy. Journal of Common Market Studies
Monti, M. (2004). A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future. SPEECH/
04/477. Brussels: DG COMP.
Mörth, U., & Jacobsson, K. (1998). Paradoxes of Europeanization. Swedish cases. Report 1998: 2.
Stockholm: SCORE.
Olsen, J. P. (2007). Europe in search of political order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Olsen, J. P. (2009). Democratic government, institutional autonomy and the dynamics of change. West
European Politics, 32, 439–465.
Peters, B. G. (2010). Bureaucracy and democracy. Public Organization Review, 10, 209–222.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration. A sociological interpretation. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Staatscourant (Official gazette): no. 12076, 29 July 2010.
Støle, Ø. (2006). Towards a multilevel union administration? The decentralisation of EU competition
policy. In M. Egeberg (Ed.), Multilevel union administration: the transformation of executive politics
in Europe. Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke.
Sundström, G. (2000). Fallstudie av det svenska EU-arbetet på konkurrensområdet (”Case study of the
Swedish EU-work in the competition domain”). Stockholm: Statskontoret.
Sundström, G., & Jacobsson, B. (2007). The embedded state. From government to governance: the case of
Sweden. Report 2007: 3. Stockholm: SCORE.
Thatcher, M. (2005). The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe.
Governance, 18, 347–373.
Trondal, J. (2010). An emergent European executive order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Van de Gronden, J. W., & de Vries, S. A. (2006). Independent competition authorities in the EU. Utrecht
Law Review, 2, 32–66.
Verhoest, K., Roness, P. G., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2010). Autonomy and
control of state agencies. Comparing states and agencies. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Wilks, S. (2005). Agency escape: decentralization or dominance of the European Commission in the
modernisation of competition policy? Governance, 18, 431–452.
Wilks, S. (2007). Agencies, networks, discourses and the trajectory of European competition enforcement.
European Competition Journal, 3(2), 415–442.
Wilks, S., & McGowan, L. (1996). Competition policy in the European Union. Creating a federal agency.
In B. Doern & S. Wilks (Eds.), Comparative competition policy. National institutions in a global
market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yesilkagit, K. (2007) Whose regulators? Competing perspectives on bureaucratic autonomy - the case of
the Dutch Competition Authority. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6–
8 September 2007.
Ole Andreas Danielsen is PhD-student at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory,
University of Bergen.
Kutsal Yesilkagit is Associate Professor at Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University.
The Effects of European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory…
